نوع مقاله : علمی پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران
2 دانشگاه شیراز
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
While traditional models of constitutional review (American and European) empower courts to invalidate laws, the "dialogic" or "weak-form" model, seen in systems like the UK and Canada, offers a distinct alternative. In this approach, courts can declare laws incompatible with constitutional norms but cannot annul them outright. The final decision is deferred to political bodies (e.g., Parliament), fostering an inter-institutional dialogue rather than imposing judicial supremacy.
This article conducts a comparative analysis of this dialogic model and the constitutional review mechanism in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It demonstrates that, despite foundational differences, Iran's system exhibits key dialogic characteristics. Historically, repeated deadlocks between the elected Parliament and the supervisory Guardian Council led to the creation of the Expediency Discernment Council as a final political arbitrator. This institution, legitimized through constitutional amendment, resolves fundamental disputes by balancing constitutional principles with political expediency, thereby placing ultimate decisional authority in a political rather than a purely judicial body.
The study concludes that the Iranian framework, through its unique hybrid structure, functionally aligns with the core premise of dialogic constitutionalism: the avoidance of rigid judicial finality and the incorporation of political institutions in the resolution of fundamental constitutional conflicts. This analysis contributes to broader comparative constitutional scholarship by illustrating how dialogic principles can manifest in diverse legal and political contexts.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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