نوع مقاله : علمی پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه مازندران، بابلسر، ایران.
2 استاد گروه حقوق خصوصی، دانشکد حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه مازندران، بابلسر، ایران.
3 استادیار گروه حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه مازندران، بابلسر، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
In sub-delegated agency, despite the principle of contractual relativity, the acts of intermediate agents in cases of negligence create liability that may extend obligations to parties beyond the immediate agents. A central question this research seeks to answer is how liability for harmful acts - stemming from the negligence of both the primary agent and subsequent intermediate agents - should be properly distributed.
The findings reveal that Unlike Iranian law and the view of some Imami jurists (who maintain that the principle of contractual relativity does not prevent liability of subsequent intermediate agents toward the original principal), French law, based on the nature of representation and the principle of contractual relativity, structures the legal relationship between intermediate agents and the principal such that when intermediate agents commit harmful acts, they are only liable to their immediate predecessor (the primary or first agent). Under this framework, compensation for damages to the principal caused by harmful acts of intermediate agents is not direct, but rather flows through the mechanism of liability for acts of subordinates (responsabilité du fait d'autrui), making the first agent ultimately responsible. However, the principal retains the right to claim damages from subsequent sub-agents. Using a descriptive-analytical method, this study examines how liability for negligence in harmful acts of intermediate agents (assuming the permissibility of sub-delegation) is distributed under Iranian and French law.
کلیدواژهها [English]